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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
clusion is deprived of its fullest significance by the apparent de-
lusion of the Court that it is here merely applying the old and
established principle when it says, "The course of decision in this
court exhibits a firm adherence to these principles." That is
highly questionable, to say the least. Opportunities, however, are
presented. The door to economic realism has been opened; it
remains to be seen whether the judicial mind will choose to cross
the threshold.
NORMAN PARKER, '34.
THE EXTENT OF THE RIGHT OF A PUBLIC UTILITY TO
REFUSE SERVICE
The primary question in any discussion of the activities known
as public utilities always comes back to one central point, which is
the problem of regulation. In facing this pervasive issue we are
bound to arrive either immediately or ultimately at the limits of
the regulative power. Perhaps the two main divisions into which
all the problems fall are simple, namely, (1) is the particular issue
one in which the public is interested as a body? or (2) is the
issue one in which primarily an individual and the public utility
are at odds? Of course, the classification cannot be as simple as
stated because in many situations the individual is involved as
one of the public and, therefore, it is a public question. Again,
the utility may appear to have infringed the rights of some indi-
vidual and the infringement may be unjustfied because it is a
discrimination, while in another instance an apparent discrimina-
tion may be due entirely to action on the part of the individual
and investigation may show that in the particular case the action
taken by the utility is not discriminatory in its nature.
The word "regulate" seems always to be used in connection
with the state and federal commissions' administrative functions
in regard to public utilities and few persons ever think of the
utilities right of self-regulation. Yet such a right exists, though
it is not as self-evident and as prominent as in businesses which
are not affected with a public interest. This right of self-regula-
tion is that right of management in the business of utilities which
the law concedes to remain in them after the commissions are
delegated their general supervisory and regulatory powers, since
the power of the state to regulate the conduct and business of a
public service corporation is limited by the consideration that it is
not the owner of the property of such corporation, nor clothed
with the general power of management incident to ownership.'
1 Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Mo. P. S. Comm. (1923)
262 U. S. 275.
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Aside from regulation of rates the most important function of
a commission is the supervision of public utility service. Compe-
tition, the natural incentive to good service is usually removed by
state sanction, and in its stead the commission is empowered to
lay down a standard as to quality and extent of service which
shall be fair and reasonable, both to the company and to the pub-
lic. The utilities themselves establish regulations and rules to
govern their service relations with their patrons, which are
usually filed with the commission. These, when so filed, may be
passed upon by the commission as to their reasonableness insofar
as they may affect the health, comfort, safety, or convenience of
the public.2 The Missouri statutes expressly give the state com-
mission this right in so many words.3
The purpose of this note will be to inspect that branch of self-
regulation wherein the utility has a right to refuse service to an
applicant because of some matter concerning the latter's conduct
or character which runs athwart the utility's rules and regula-
tions governing its business dealings with its customers and
where such refusal is based on the utility's own business policy or
practice rather than upon some rule or regulation imposed on it
by the state commission. An attempt will be made to collate
the decisions of the various commissions and state courts in order
to determine if possible, (1) whether there is any true field in
which it can be said that the situations arising therein are truly
within the scope of what might be called unregulated managerial
discretion or self-regulation; and (2) to ascertain the governing
principles, if any, which control such situations.
RULES AS TO THE USE OF THE SERVICES OFFERED
A public utility is not required to, and may refuse to serve one
who wishes to use the services the utility offers for an illegal pur-
pose. There seems to be no question of such a right in the de-
cisions, the main issue in most cases being whether the utility had
reasonable grounds for believing the applicant would put the
services to an immoral or illegal use. Thus an innkeeper may
refuse a room to a card shark4 where the circumstances point to
the fact that the room is to be used for gaming; or to a known
prostitute2 where he has reason to believe the room will be used
for purposes of prostitution. The same rule holds good as to
such passengers on a railroad. 6 But the innkeeper or carrier
2 State ex rel. K. C. Power & Light Co. v. Mo. P. S. Comm. (1925) 310 Mo.
313, P. U. R. 1926 A, 783, 275 S. W. 940.
3 R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5190.
4 Watkins v. Cope (1913) 84 N. J. L. 143, 86 At]. 545; Jones v. Bland
(1921) 182 N. C. 70, 10 S. E. 344.
i Curtis v. Murphy (1885) 63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. 825.
6 Thurston v. Union Pac. R. Co. (1887) 4 Dill. 321, Fed. Cas., Case No.
14,019.
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must have good grounds for believing that the person seeking his
services is going to use them for such an illegal or immoral pur-
pose-the mere fact that the person is of doubtful character not
being in itself a solid basis for refusing to render services, espe-
cially in the case of carriers 7 (since hotels and inns from their
very nature are more likely to be the places resorted to by such
people to ply their illegal trades). Along with the fact that the
carrier and innkeeper are duty bound to protect other users of
their facilities and may also protect their own interests, the rule
is founded on the reasoning that these two utilities owe the duty
of serving to only bona fide travelers.8
In the case of what may be called municipal utilities, in contra-
distinction to the old common-law-created utilities of carriers and
innkeepers, the same principle applies, no duty of service being
owed to one who wishes to further an illegal or immoral purpose
thereby. So a customer of an electric, water, telephone or gas
company may be denied the right to receive service in any case
where the use to which it is to be put involves, primarily, some-
thing unlawful, either by aiding the act directly or else making it
more possible of consummation. Thus a telephone company may
refuse service where it is intended to be used in a bawdy house,
since it would directly aid and abet what not only is a public
nuisance but a criminal profession and trade as well. 9 'However,
a discontinuance or refusal to give telephone service cannot be
justified solely on the ground that the user is a person of immoral
or illegal habits and, therefore, the home of a prostitute or bhwdy-
house keeper must be tendered such service if such home is not
used as a place of prostitution.1 The same rule and its qualifica-
tion is applicable where a subscriber conducts a betting business. 1
And a telegraph company may refuse a message which, on its face,
is obscene or indecent,12 or is for a notoriously illegal purpose. 18
The purpose or use to which the service is put need not neces-
sarily be illegal or immoral; if it violates a reasonable rule of the
company prohibiting such a use it may be a solid basis for discon-
tinuing service until the customer ceases his violation of the rule
in the particular instance. A rule of a water company which
7 Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co. (1880) 5 F. 499; Reasor v. Paducah & Ill.
Ferry Co. (1913) 152 Ky. 220, 153 S. W. 222; Thurston v. U. P. R. Co.,
supra note 6.8 Rex v. Luellin (1700) 12 Mod. 445; Beale v. Posey (1882) 72 Ala. 323;
Lamond v. Richard (1897) 1 Q. B. 541.
9 Godwin v. Carolina T. & T. Co. (1904) 136 N. C. 258, 48 S. E. 636.10 Ibid.
31 People ex rel. Restmeyer v. N. Y. Tel. Co. (1916) 173 App. Div. 132,
159 N. Y. S. 369.
12 See West. Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson (1877) 59 Ind. 495.
Is Smith v. Tel. Co. (1887) 84 Ky. 664, 2 S. W. 483.
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prohibits sprinkling,' 4 filling a swimming pool,15 or using the
water for building purposes' 6 has been upheld where a limited
supply, or the fact that the customer was charged a certain rate
in reliance upon his promise to use the water only for domestic
household purposes, has been shown to exist. Such regulations
are clearly reasonable in such cases, a limited supply giving the
company the right to limit the use to only that which is for neces-
sary purposes in order to protect the public as a whole, and secure
a supply to each consumer which will supply his needs if not his
other requirements, while the company clearly has the right to
have the customer set forth in his application the property and
purpose for which the water is to be used and hold him to such an
employment of the advantages it extends to him.' 7
Where a telephone subscriber allows and permits nonsubscrib-
ers to use his telephone to avoid payment of toll charges which
the latter would otherwise have to pay the company may sever his
connection,18 and the same result has been reached as to a cus-
tomer of a water company who furnishes water regularly to a
non-paying consumer in a case where the charge for the service
is a flat rate per month.' 9 A county court in Pennsylvania went
so far as to refuse to enjoin the removal of a telephone by the
telephone company where the subscriber violated a regulation of
the former in permitting the use of his 'phone by others than his
immediate family and other subscribers. 20 These decisions may
all be justified on the grounds that it would be unfair to the serv-
ice company and to other patrons to allow one of the latter to
overcrowd the telephone lines with, or draw water for, persons
who should be paying their proportionate share to the upkeep of
the utility.
Not only must the applicant be desirous of the service and in-
tend to use it for a legal and proper purpose, but also he must put
himself in a proper position to demand service; and until he does
so and complies with the conditions precedent there is no present
obligation on the part of the utility to serve him. Thus a munici-
pal service company may impose reasonable conditions as to con-
nections with its system and refuse to serve one who neglects or
declines to put himself into the prerequisite condition as com-
manded by the rules of the company. An applicant who wishes
1" Antisdel v. Mocatawa Resort Co. (Mich. 1929) 220 N. W. 768.
15 Re Peters-Rhodes Co. (Calif. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 B, 787.
16 Bleach v. Momouth County Water Co. (N. J. 1917) P. U. R. 1917 C, 602.
17 See notes 10, 11, and 12.
18 Re Lincoln T. & T. Co. (Nebr. 1916) P. U. R. 1916 D, 416.
19 Ariz. Corp. Comm. v. Morenci Water Co. (Ariz. 1915) P. U. R. 1915
C, 525.
20 Att. v. Johnston Tel. Co. (Ct. Com. Pleas, Cambria Co., Pa. 1908).
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water, gas, electric or telephone service cannot hire an independ-
ent contractor to connect his premises with the water or gas main,
or the electric or telephone cables of the utility. The latter has
the sole right to make such connections itself by means of its own
men. The well known principle of the right of self-protection
underlies the right of the company to refuse to make connections
or allow connections with a building owned, occupied and wired
or connected by a third person or his agent, liable to be improperly
wired or equipped for connection with the mains or cables. This
possibility gives to the utility a power to dictate in a rea-
sonable manner in such matters as the entrance of the connec-
tion, the manner and type of wiring, and the type and style
of the switch box and other safety appliances.2 1 A case in Mis-
souri 22 goes so far as to say that the company may designate a
certain style of hydrant, or cut-off, as the only one which shall be
used. Another decision from the same state23 allowed an electric
company to adopt a rule requiring a particular kind of patented
fuse box, in place of a cheaper box approved by the National
Board of Fire Underwriters and by the city electrician. The
Supreme Court of Missouri, though the new box was three times
as expensive as the old one and though the consumer has to pay
the cost of replacement, held the rule not to be arbitrary or un-
reasonable in view of the greater convenience, safety, economy
.and reduction of damage to property and life resulting from fires
which would be achieved by the change. These two cases show
the extreme liberality of Missouri on the question, the highest
efficiency being allowed to govern the decision as to whether such
a rule is reasonable or not. The position taken, however, seems
questionable because consumers are put at a decided disadvantage,
inasmuch as new and safer devices are continually being per-
fected, and to require the public to pay for such changes is putting
a severe strain on the individual's purse. Moreover, in both
cases the device was patented and therefore the company was al-
lowed to profit at the expense of the public, since the utility con-
trolled the installation of the device. A Kentucky case goes to
the other extreme in holding that no proper plumber may be ex-
cluded from making water and sewerage connections. 24 The
usual holding seems to be that though the company cannot dictate
as to the type of fixtures on the premises, it can insist upon all in-
stallation requirements made by it which affect the safety of the
premises wired; since the company is liable for property damage
21 Hawkins v. Vt. Hydro-Elec. Corp. (1924) 98 Vt. 176, 126 Atl. 517.
22 State v. Goodfellow (1876) 1 Mo. App. 495.
23 State ex rel. K. C. Power & Light Co. v. Mo. P. S. Comm. (1925) 310 Mo.
313, P. U. R. 1926 A, 783, 275 S. W. 940.
24 Franke v. Paducah Water Supply Co. (1889) 88 Ky. 467, 11 S. W. 432.
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or personal injuries sustained by reason of defective wiring or
appliance, when it should know of the unsafe condition prevail-
ing on the premises. 25
A carrier is not compelled to receive goods so long before the
time of departure as to add unfairly to its risk,26 nor to accept
freight on a passenger train or a passenger on a freight train;
nor must it accept dangerous persons or goods.27 And the same
rules would apply in the case of the innkeeper.28 But though a
hotel cannot refuse accommodations to a traveler regardless of
the time of day or night he makes application for accommoda-
tionS29 since the weary wayfarer needs the protection of the inn
at the very time he arrives, the carrier may do so3o since trains
and the men who work on them cannot be running continually.
As applied to the water, gas, electric and telephone companies the
rule would seem to be the same as in the case of the innkeeper,
yet the small size or the habits of a community may negative the
right of patrons and consumers to a continuous supply at all
hours.31
CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF THE PATRON
For the protection of others being served as well as for the pro-
tection of its own interests, any applicant for service who will
endanger person or property may be rejected by the utility at the
outset or afterwards. Thus one who attacks another on a car-
rier,3 2 or who attempts to break down the door of a hotel 33 may
be refused service. This principle is applicable in the case of all
disorderly and dangerous persons; and it seems too clear to cite
the wealth of cases supporting it. 3 4 However, the rule differs
when the previous conduct of the applicant, as contrasted to
his present actions, is used as a basis for refusing him service.
25 Hawkins v. Vt. Hydro-Elec. Corp. (1924) supra note 21.
28 Bouker v. Long Island R. Co. (1895) 89 Hun. 205, 35 N. Y. S. 23; Lane
v. Colton (1701) 12 Mod. 472.
27 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Logan (1889) 88 Ky. 232, 10 S. W. 655; The
Nitro Glycerine Case (1873) 15 Wall. 524; Leonard v. St. L. Trans. Co.(1905) 115 Mo. App. 349, U. S. W. 452; Markham v. Brown (1837) 8 N. H.
523.
28 Reg. v. Rymer (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 136.
29 Rex v. Ivens (1837) 7 Car. & P. 213; see Lawson on Bailments see. 73
and cases cited.8o Pitlock v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1872) 109 Mass. 452; Cronkhite v. Wells
(1865) 32 N. Y. 247; Re Am. Ry. Express Co. (1919) 20 N. Y. Off. Dept. R.
125, P. U. R. 1919 E, 548.
81 See I Wyman, sec. 396.
32 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Logan (1889) supra note 27.
38 Goodenow v. Travis (1808) 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 427.
81 Among others, see Garricott v. N. Y. State Rys. (N. Y. 1918) 119 N. E.
94; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Weber (1885) 33 Kan. 543, 6 Pac. 877;
Howell v. Jackson (1837) 8 N. H. 523.
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The general rule seems to be that service cannot be refused where
the applicant presents himself in a decent and orderly fashion and
condition even though his conduct on previous occasions caused
his ejection or rejection.35 This is because the past misconduct
has no relation to the present service. But if the past miscon-
duct has been so long continued that it makes only too probable a
repetition of it, then, notwithstanding protests of reformation,
there may be a refusal to give another chance; however, the case
must be extreme to justify such action by the company.36
Yet, what may be reasonable rule for one utility may not be
for another. Therefore though a hotel may refuse service to an
unchaste woman merely on that ground,37 a carrier or municipal
utility cannot, if her conduct is proper in presenting herself. The
exception in the case of the inn seems to be based on the fact that
the proprietor has a right to keep his guests, who would other-
wise doubtless leave, while the other utilities because of their
usual complete monopolies and the less close relation of their
patrons.have not the same justification. The same rule and ex-
ception as to innkeepers applies also in the case of gamblers,
thieves, and other followers of illegal professions.38
A person may also be undesirable, and therefore refused serv-
ice, on account of the impropriety of his attire. But uncon-
ventionality of costume alone is usually no excuse for rejection.
Thus it has been held that a woman in bloomers could not be ex-
cluded from an inn,39 yet that a chimney sweep in his working
clothes might.40 However, in the former case it was held that the
innkeeper had a right to refuse to serve the woman in the coffee
room of the inn and could confine her to the accommodations in
the bar parlor. To the same effect is a recent Oklahoma case4'
in which the Court held reasonable a rule requiring coats to be
worn by men when served in the dining room. In that case coats
were supplied to the patrons lacking them and the lunch counter
35Atwater v. Sawyer (1884) 76 Me. 539; Story v. Norfolk & S. R. Co.(1903) 133 N. C. 59; Reasor v. Paducah & Ill. Ferry Co. (1913) 152 Ky.
220, 153 S. W. 222; Huffman v. Marcy Mutual Tel. Co. (1909) 143 Ia. 590,
121 N. W. 1033.
36 Stevenson v. West Seattle Land & Imp. Co. (1900) 22 Wash. 84, 60 Pac.
51; Minerva & Canton Trans. Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Tel. Co. (Ohio,
1920) P. U. R. 1920 C, 801; Pugh v. City & Sub. Tel. Co. (1883) 9 Conn.
Law Bull. 104.
837 Raider v. Dixie Inn et al. (1923) 198 Ky. 152, 248 S. W. 229; Brown v.
Memphis & C. R. Co. (1880) 5 F. 499.
38 Nelson v. Boldt (1910) 180 F. 779; Thurston v. Union P. R. Co. (1877)
4 Dill. 321; Watkins v. Cope (1913) 84 N. J. Law 143, 86 Atl. 545; Markham
v. Brown (1837) 8 N. H. 523.
39 Regina v. Sprague (1899) 63 J. P. 233.
40 Pidgeon v. Legge (1857) 5 Week. Rep. 649, 21 J. P. 743.
41 Harvey v. Corp. Comm. (1924) 102 Okla. 266, 229 Pac. 428.
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could be used, where the patron refused to comply with the coat
rule. Under such circumstances the rule is clearly not un-
reasonable.
Peculiar circumstances may justify a refusal to serve at times.
Thus in the famous case of Pearson v. Duane42 the Supreme Court
held that though the plaintiff could recover because he was ejected
after being accepted, yet the captain of the ship might well have
rejected his original application to travel to San Francisco, where
a violent fate probably awaited plaintiff, who had been banished
from that city by the Vigilance Committee.
The mere fact of infancy or that a married woman is traveling
alone is no excuse for refusing to serve such person merely be-
cause of the applicant's inability to contract. 43 This is assumed
to be the law in a Missouri case44 wherein a married woman ap-
plied for gas service on her own responsibility but was wrong-
fully refused by the company. It should be noted, however, that
at that time the Married Women's Act had been in force in that
state for some time. Unattended and helpless persons may be
refused accommodations by a carrier or innkeeper because of the
liability of the latter if injury results after acceptance. 45 This
applies to sick persons, 46 those blind 47 or insane 48 and to very
young children,49 also to those in a very intoxicated condition.50
The same rule applies with more force to those infected with a
contagious disease. 51
Since a utility has a right to self-protection, a customer who
abuses the privileges extended to him by the company may be
refused further service. An innkeeper may refuse to continue
to furnish accommodations to one who, by the length of his stay
or otherwise, ceases to be a "traveler."52 One who resorts to a
hotel solely for immoral intercourse with a woman companion is
not entitled to be allotted a room,53 neither is a party seeking such
a room for purpose of card-playing. 54 Where water is supplied
42 (1867) 4 Wall. 605.
43Watson v. Cross (1865) 2 Duv. 147.
44Vanderberg v. K. C. Mo. Gas Co. (1907) 126 Mo. App. 600, 105 S. W. 17.
45Connors v. Cunard S. S. Co. (1910) 204 Mass. 310, 90 N. E. 601.
46 Ibid.
47 Zachery v. Mobile & 0. R. R. Co. (1898) 75 Miss. 746, 23 So. 435.
48 Meyer v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co. (1893) 54 F. 116.
49 Braun v. N. P. Ry. Co. (1900) 79 Minn. 404, 82 N. W. 675; Warfield v.
L. & N. Ry. Co. (1900) 104 Tenn. 74, 55 S. W. 304.
50 Jenks v. Coleman (1835) 2 Summ. 221; Paris & G. N. R. Co. v. Robinson
(1909 Tex. Civ. App.), 114 S. W. 658.
51 Pullman Co. v. Krauss (1906) 145 Ala. 395, 40 So. 398; State v. Steele(1890) 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478.
52 Lamond v. Richard (1897) 1 Q. B. 541.
55 Curtis v. Murphy (1885) 63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. 825.
6,Jones v. Bland (1921) 182 N. C. 70, 108 S. E. 344.
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upon tap basis, a water company may refuse to continue serving
one who wantonly wastes water,50 or persists in supplying non-
consumers. 56 An innkeeper can refuse shelter to one who insists
upon bringing in dogs,57 so can entrance be forbidden into a street
car to one who attempts to bring in cumbrous parcels 5 or insists
upon being accompanied by a dog, 9 because were the innkeeper
or carrier to permit this it would not only hinder and delay serv-
ice to others but might be the basis of tort liability of the util-
ity to other guests or passengers injured thereby. One who
permits access to his telephone by others than his immediate
family, contrary to the basis upon which service is being ren-
dered to him, may be refused further service.60 And as a tele-
phone company undertakes to provide all the apparatus necessary
for its service, it may positively forbid any interference with the
instruments. Thus where a subscriber insisted upon violating a
rule of the company providing that no extension instruments, not
furnished by it, were to be attached to the regular receiver, it
was held the company had a right to refuse him all further serv-
ice.6 1 It is justification enough for such a regulation that the
company may protect its circuit from possible interference.
Again, a telephone company may cut out a subscriber who per-
sists in using profane and indecent language to the operators and
to those with whom he talks,62 or who habitually breaks in upon a
party line when others are using it,3 the company having a right
to protect its employees from abuse as well as its subscribers.
Furthermore, the maintenance of proper efficiency on the whole
service demands that interruptions should be summarily dealt
with. One who is engaged in a scheme of defrauding a utility
by tampering with the meter, or by tapping the mains, of course
cannot complain if his service is shut off.0 4 In a case before the
Missouri Public Service Commission where the evidence showed
55 Harbinson v. Knoxville Water Co. (Tenn. 1899) 53 S. W. 993; Robbins
v. Bangor Ry. & Elec. Co. (1905) 100 Me. 496, 62 Ati. 136.56 Ariz. Corp. Comm. v. Morenci Water Co. (Ariz. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 C,525.
57 Reg. v. Rymer (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 136, 25 Week. Rep. 415.
5S Dowd v. Albany Ry. Co. (1900) 47 App. Div. 202, 62 N. Y. S. 179; Ray v.
United Traction Co. (1904) 96 App. Div. 48, 89 N. Y. S. 49.
59 Gregory v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1896) 100 Ia. 345, 69 N. W. 532.60 Att. v. Johnstown Tel. Co., supra note 20; People v. Hudson R. Tel. Co.(1887) 19 Abb. 466; Re Lincoln T. & T. Co. (Neb. 1916) P. U. R. D., 416.
61 Gardner v. Providence Tel. Co. (1901) 23 R. I. 262, 49 At. 1004.
,2Minerva & Cahton Trans. Co. v. Farmers & Merchants Tel. Co. (Ohio
1920) P. U. R. 1920 C, 801; but see Metzer v. Clinton Co. Tel. Co. (Mo. 1917)
P. U. R. 1918 A, 567, 5 Mo. P. S. C. 509.
63 Huffman v. Marcy Mut. Tel. Co. (1909) 143 Ia. 590, 121 N. W. 1033.
64 Macke v. Union Elec. Lt. & Power Co. (1928) 16 Mo. P. S. C. 669; Hoberg
v. N. Y. Edison Co. (1932) 258 N. Y. 701, 144 Misc. 726, P. U. R. 1932 C, 38;
Krumenaker v. Doughterty (1902) 74 App. Div. 452, 77 N. Y. S. 467.
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that a patron's electric meter had been tampered with and a
"jumper" affixed to it the Commission held that the company had
a right to refuse service to such patron until the latter paid $25.00
for the installation of lock-box to protect the meter.65 In this
case a statute imposed penalties for using "jumpers" so that a
rule of the company to that effect was unnecessary. Yet had
neither statute nor company rule been in existence the decision
would have been the same since-
"all electric users who do not indulge in such practices must
pay for the current that is diverted"
and because the company is entitled to a fixed rate of return upon
its investment and rates are adjusted to insure such return. 6
RULES AS TO PAYMENTS
Although one who engages himself in public employment is
bound to serve all who apply, it is necessarily upon the condition
that he may demand in advance his reasonable charge for the
service required. This is a fundamental principle in the law re-
lating to utilities and appears to be a privilege in consideration
of an extraordinary liability and duty.67 The carrier of goods
may in all cases insist upon the payment of his charges when the
goods are tendered to him.68 The carrier of passengers may
make it a condition before accepting a passenger for carriage that
the fare be paid in advance,69 or that a ticket shall be purchased
and presented. 70 Similarly an innkeeper is not obliged to receive
one who is not able to pay for entertainment.7 1 So must a tele-
phone user pay the usual charge for the subsequent period,7 2 and
even one who has paid may be denied service, where payment
was wrongfully tendered. Thus one using a pay telephone must
deposit the coin according to the instructions posted on the trans-
mitter and cannot successfully contend that he should get his
number, even though he has deposited his coin, if such deposit
was made contrary to the posted rules.73 It is universally con-
ceded by the courts that either a municipal or private concern
supplying water to the public may prescribe and enforce a rule
or regulation which provides for shutting off the water supply
"' Macke v. U. E. Lt. & P. Co., supra note 64.
66 Ibid., and see Handelman v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co. (Mo. 1927)
P. U. R. 1928 A, 94, accord.
,1 Evergreen Cem. Ass'n v. Beecher (1885) 53 Conn. 551, 5 Ati. 353.
68 Fitch v. Newberry (Mich. 1843) 1 Doug. 1.
4, Elder v. International Ry. Co. (1910) 122 N. Y. S. 880.
70 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Loutham (1898) 80 Ill. App. 579.
71 Markham v. Brown (1837) 8 N. H. 523.
72 Ashley v. Rocky Mt. Bell Tel. Co. (1901) 25 Mont. 286, 64 Pac. 765.
73 Gifford v. Glen Tel. Co. (1907) 54 Misc. 468, 106 N. Y. S. 53.
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from a consumer who has defaulted in payment of the same; at
least where there is no dispute as to the amount owing or the
justness of the charge and the water was not furnished for some
other place or person, or for a separate and distinct transaction
from that for which a right to the continuance of the supply is
claimed.74 Even a rule requiring a subscriber to pay for all long-
distance messages originating from his office or house telephone,
whether previously approved or authorized by him or not, has
been held reasonable,75 the court pointing out that the large num-
ber of subscribers in the community made it impossible for oper-
ators to distinguish voices and that the complainant could protect
himself by locking the room where the phone was located.
In many cases it may be seen that the rule of payment in ad-
vance is not workable in its simple form, for it cannot be known
in advance how much service will be taken. This is particularly
true of gas, water and electric service where, instead of a flat rate,
measured service is given. In such cases the utility is allowed
to require a deposit or else satisfactory evidence from the appli-
cant of the stability of his credit. The deposit normally required
is that sum which the average consumer usually pays on his
monthly bill, say five dollars. But circumstances may warrant
the demand for a larger sum. Thus a hotel which used $60.00
worth of gas a week was required to make a $100.00 deposit. 70
On the other hand, an applicant may be refused service for fail-
ure to establish his credit by answering a questionnaire in regard
to his ability to pay. 7 The rule of a company requiring ad-
vanced payments or deposits to guarantee payment for services
to be rendered has been approved in numerous cases.73 The Wis-
consin Commission 9 went so far as to hold that a rule requiring
that new telephone subscribers pay a whole year's rental in ad-
vance, with a provision for a refund should service be discon-
tinued for any reason, was reasonable and valid. In a New York
case a subscriber complained to the commission because the tele-
phone company refused to serve him any longer unless he made
a deposit to cover future bills two months in advance. Such de-
74 Dodd v. City of Atlanta (1922) 154 Ga. 33, 113 S. E. 166; Sims v. Ala.
Water Co. (1920) 205 Ala. 378, 87 So. 688; Mulrooney v. Obear (1903) 171
Mo. 613, 71 S. W. 1019.
75 S. W. T. & T. Co. v. Sharp (1915) 118 Ark. 541, 177 S. W. 25.
76 Williams v. Mutual Gas Co. (1884) 52 Mich. 499, 18 N. W. 236.
77 In Re Practices of Utilities in Requiring Deposits from Consumers Be-
fore Connecting Service (D. C. 1929) P. U. C. No. 22.
78 Univ. Sch. Exchange v. S. W. Bell Tel. Co. (Okla. 1929) Corp. Comm.
No. 9047; Riegel v. P. U. Comm. of D. C. (App. D. C. 1931) 48 F (2) 1023
Rehearing denied Apr. 25, 1931; In Re Richmond Home Tel. Co. (Va. 1929)
P. S. C. No. 9826.
79 In Re Lake Shore Tel. Co. (Wis. 1928) R. R. C. U. -3687.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
posit would amount to $250.00 and the subscriber pointed out
that credit was extended to others than himself and contended
that the company's action amounted to a discrimination against
him. But the commission, after reviewing the evidence which
showed that the complainant was habitually delinquent in the
payment of his bills and could not give a satisfactory reference
(as that of a bank rather than that of his own customers), went
into the matter quite thoroughly and, finding that the uncollected
revenues of the company for the previous year had amounted to
$793,000.00, mostly composed of uncollected bills, pointed out
that losses of this character naturally had to be taken up some-
where in the rate structure and were finally reflected in the rates
of paying subscribers. The Commission, in dismissing the com-
plaint, said it was manifestly unjust that subscribers who did
pay their bills promptly should be taxed an extra amount to make
up the losses incurred by delinquent accounts.80
A Washington case s' seems to have been the first decision
wherein the question was raised as to the justness of a rule of a
utility requiring payment in advance, or else service at a higher
rate. The case came up in 1910; though the practice seems to
have been quite general in the utility field much earlier. The
court decided that the rule was reasonable inasmuch as it aided
greatly in reducing defaults and delinquencies in payments, with
resulting lowering of the companies' outlay for the employment
of collectors and office forces, which saving ultimately accrued to
the consuming public as a whole. In close analogy to this rule
is the one of making an extra charge for collections from delin-
quent subscribers, which is based on the same reasoning for its
justification as the previous rule.82
In connection with the rules of a company requiring payment
in advance, or a deposit, or higher rates and extra charges to
delinquents, arises the problem of discrimination in requiring
some customers to conform to such a regulation, while not en-
forcing it as to others. As to carriers it is apparently well es-
tablished that, as no one has a right to have service without pre-
payment, there can be no complaint made if some are given service
without making them pay in advance, while others are obliged to
make a prepayment.83 Upon this reasoning the same thing holds
11 Manhattan Reporting Bureau v. N. Y. Telephone Co. (1925) P. U. R.
1926 B, 1.
81 State ex rel. McMahon v. Indep. Tel. Co. (1910) 59 Wash. 156, 109
Pac. 366.
82 Irvin v. Rushville Co-op. Tel. Co. (1903) 161 Ind. 524, 69 N. E. 258, and
see State v. Commander (1925) 211 Ala. 230, 100 So. 223.
b Randall v. R. R. (1891) 108 N. C. 612, 13 S. E. 137; Brown & B. Coal Co.
v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (1910) 159 Mich. 565, 124 N. W. 528.
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good in the case of other public utilities. Thus a telephone
company may, it has been held, extend credit to such persons as
it may deem advisable, demanding payment in advance from all
others.84 Yet such a discrimination seems always open to search
for its good faith, the New York Court of Appeals in a case be-
fore it saying that one telegraph company had to transmit dis-
patches of a rival company upon the same terms as it did for any
other customer, irrespective of the fact that it was a competitor,
since the facts disclosed that the latter's credit was as good or
better than that of the numerous parties to whom the former was
extending credit.85
The tender of payment must be made in such a denomination
of money that change can be reasonable and quickly given. This
applies especially in the case of street car fares. A tender of a
five dollar bill to pay a five cent fare has been held to be sufficient
grounds for a denial of service,8 6 though it is only fair to point
out that in such a case the carrier had a well-known and actually
enforced rule that change for amounts above two dollars would
not be given by the company's conductors. The Supreme Court
of California, in 1889, held that in view of local conditions, a ten-
der of a five dollar gold coin (the lowest denomination of gold
coin in use in that section), could not be a basis for refusal of
service. The court went on to say, however, that-
"a passenger upon a street railway is not bound to tender the
exact fare, but must tender a reasonable sum, and the carrier
must accept such tender, and furnish change to a reasonable
amount."8
7
So it seems that though the courts are undecided as to the ade-
quacy of a five-dollar bill tender, anything above that amount
would be inadequate. As to other utilities than carriers the
question does not seem to have arisen, probably since the circum-
stances usually allow time for either customer or company to get
change for a sum which the latter cannot change at the place of
tender.
There exists a sharp conflict in the authorities as to the right
to deny service when a customer is in arrears yet is willing to
tender payment for present service. A carrier, most authorities
8 4 Johnstown Tel. Co. v. Berkebile (Mo. App. 1926) 283 S. W. 456; S. W. T.
& T. Co. v. Sharp. (1915) 118 Ark. 541, 177 S. W. 25.
85 People ex rel. Western U. Tel. Co. v. P. S. Comm. (1920) 230 N. Y. 95,
129 N. E. 220.8s6 Funderburg v. Augusta & A. Ry. Co. (1901) 81 S. C. 141, 61 S. E. 1075;
Barker v. Central Park N. & E. River Ry. Co. (1896) 151 N. Y. 237, 45
N. E. 550.
87 Barrett v. Market St. R. Co. (1889) 81 Cal. 296, 22 Pac. 859.
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agree, cannot refuse transportation to a person who has right-
fully tendered payment for present carriage, because of the fact
that on a previous occasion he failed to pay.88 The basis of such
decisions as to other utilities seems to be that in refusing to serve
those who come with ready payment, the company in question
acts contrary to its public duty, which is to serve all that apply
without discrimination. 9 The argument that the policy of a
company requiring back payments is a helpful device in making
collections is answered by saying that the company need not
extend credit in the first place; since payment in advance can al-
ways be required, and to permit the utility to refuse service to
one whom it claims to be indebted to it, makes it virtually the
judge of the justice of its claim, and puts it into a position to exact
payments to which it may not be entitled.
There are a great number of cases holding to the opposite view,
however, that a present applicant is in no position to demand a
further supply if he has not paid in the past. As was said in a
Washington case: 9 0
"The condition imposed, that the company might refuse to
furnish water to an applicant refusing to pay it a sum
due for water thereunder, is in one sense a security for the
payment thereof. Instead of forming an estimate of the
water that would likely be used, and requiring a deposit in
advance of a sufficient sum of money to cover the same, or
requiring other security for the payment thereof, the water
company provides that at stated periods payments shall be
made in order that a large sum may not accumulate, it being
willing to take its chances for a stated time without other
security; surely this is more lenient than either to demand
a bond or other security, or a deposit of a sum of money in
advance large enough to be reasonably certain of covering
the sum that should become due."
Again, the United States Supreme Court has said :91
"Not only are telephone rates fixed and regulated in the ex-
pectation that they will be paid, but the company's ability
Atwater v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (1886) 48 N. J. L. 55, 2 AtI. 803.
89 State ex rel. Payne v. Kinlock Tel. Co. (1902) 93 Mo. App. 349, 67 S. W.
684; O'Neal v. Citizens P. S. Co. of S. C. (1930) 157 S. C. 320, 154 S. E. 217;
Crow v. San Joaquin & K. R. C. & Irr. Co. (1900) 130 Cal. 309, 62 Pac. 562;
Freeman v. Macon Gas-Light Company (1908) 126 Ga. 843, 56 S. E. 61;
S. W. T. & T. Co. v. Luckett (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) 127 S. W. 856.
90 Tacoma Hotel Co. v. Tacoma Light & Water Co. (1891) 3 Wash. 316
28 Pac. 516; see Dodd v. Atlanta (1922) 154 Ga. 33, 113 S. E. 166.
9' S. W. T. & T. Co. v. Danoher (1915) 238 U. S. 482; see also Taylor v.
N. Y. Tel. Co. (1916) 160 N. Y. S. 865, 97 Misc. 160.
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properly to serve the public depends upon their prompt pay-
ment. They usually are only a few dollars per month, and
the expense incident to collecting them by legal process would
be almost prohibitive."
It is submitted that the arguments on both sides of this issue are
well put, yet the one requiring payment of arrearages before the
duty of serving arises seems the more persuasive in view of the
fact that rules requiring an extra charge and higher rates to de-
linquents have been approved and held reasonable.9 2 Of course,
in many states the right to shut off the supply for past defaults,
notwithstanding present willingness to pay, is authorized by the
legislature in the granting of the franchise to the company.
A serious problem as to shutting off service for non-payment
or arrears arises is the case where the water supply is to a build-
ing divided into tenements. Since the duty of the company is
only to bring its pipes to the cellar wall it follows that a tenant
must bring his own service pipes to the cellar wall and there have
his supply handed over to him. Where the faucet is available
to both tenants, but only one applies for and gets the connection,
the latter is liable for the whole amount due for the service and
cannot pay half and be entitled to service. 93 Where more than
one apartment or building is supplied from a single service pipe,
to cut off the entire service for violation of the company's rules
by one of the parties is unreasonable and should be modified so
as to permit an innocent consumer a reasonable time to attach
his pipes to a separately controlled service connection, which
must be supplied by the company in case the consumers occupy
different buildings. 94 The duty of service is owed to the occupier
of the premises in the case of gas, electric, water and telephone
companies; and therefore a regulation of such a company by which
it refuses to turn on water for a building until unpaid rates of
previous owners or tenants are paid, is unreasonable and in-
valid,95 and no lien, furthermore, can attach to the premises for
such charges. 96 But the legislature may provide by statute that
such charges shall constitute a lien upon the property itself.97
92 See notes 81 and 82, supra.
93 Sims v. Ala. W. Co. (1920) 205 Ala. 378, 87 So. 688.
9- Borough of Scottdale v. Citizens' Water Co. (Pa. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D,
292; Borough of Warren v. Warren Water Co. (Pa. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 B,
400.9 5 McDowed v. Avon-by-the-Sea Land & Improvement Co. (1906) 71 N. J.
Eq. 109, 63 Atl. 13; Vanderbilt et al. v. Hackensack Water Co. (N. J. Chan.
1932) 160 Atl. 825; Turner v. Revere Water Co. (1898) 171 Mass. 329, 50
N. E. 634; Farmer v. Nashville (1912) 127 Tenn. 509, 156 S. W. 189.
96 Turner v. Revere Water Co. (1898) 171 Mass. 329, 50 N. E. 634.
97East Grand Forks v. Luck (1906) 97 Minn. 373, 107 N. W. 393; see
So. Ry. Co. v. McNabb (1914) 130 Tenn. 197, 169 S. W. 757.
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In the case of carriers, more than prepayment alone may be re-
quired. The ticket system is so necessary to the protection of
the carrier that a ticket may be made indispensable to the right
to travel on the company's lines.98 Of course the rule cannot be
enforced where, in the circumstances, a ticket cannot be secured,
as, for instance, where a passenger boards the carrier at a station
where there is not office or station of the company.99 Otherwise,
a rule that cash will not be received in lieu of a ticket is within
the power of a carrier to make, 0 0 as is one prohibiting the trans-
fer of a ticket.'O' As the company has a right to reject for failure*
to produce a ticket, it necessarily follows that it has the lesser
right of making a rule requiring an extra charge for not having a
ticket.'" 2
All authorities agree that a public service company cannot re-
fuse to render the service which it is authorized by its charter
to furnish, because of some collateral matter not related to that
service. Therefore a gas company cannot refuse to supply one
who owes for coke sold by the company.103 In an Illinois case' 04
an electric company attempted to make an owner pay for a trans-
former, usually furnished free to those who had their premises
wired by it, because he had not let the company wire his premises;
but the court held that the company's position was untenable.
The proprietor of a summer resort who furnished water and light
to owners of cottages was not allowed, in a Michigan decision, 05
to deny one of the latter such service because of his failure to
comply with a rule requiring owners of cottages to provide septic
tanks for disposal of sewage. In a Pennsylvania case' 06 it was
held that the plaintiff's water supply could not be shut off because
he was delinquent in his payment of sewer and maintenance
assessments.
DUPLICATION OF SERVICE
It may be laid down as a general rule that a service company
must serve all who apply, whether or not they are dealing with
a rival of such company. 0 7 Nor may the company excuse a
98 Corwin v. Long I. R. Co. (1885) 2 N. Y. City Ct. 106.
99 So. Kan. Ry. Co. v. Hinsdale (1888) 38 Kan. 507, 16 Pac. 937.
100 St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Blythe (1910) 94 Ark. 153, 126 S. W. 386.
101 Schuman v. McDonald (1903) 179 Mo. 163, 168 S. W. 1020, writ of error
dismissed (1904) 196 U. S. 644.
102 Reese v. Penn. R. Co. (1890) 131 Pa. 422,19 Atl. 72; Wilsey v. L. & N. R.
Co. (1886) 83 Ky. 511.
103 Re Commercial Bank & London Gas Co. (1860) 20 Up. Can. Q. B. 233.
104 Snell v. Clinton Elec. Lt., Heat & P. Co. (1902) 196 Ill. 626, 63 N. E.
1082.
105 Ten Broek v. Miller et al. (1927) 240 Mich. 667, 216 N. W. 385.
106 Penn. Chautauqua v. P. S. Comm. of Pa. (1932) 160 Atl. 225.
107 State ex rel. Gwynn v. Citizens Tel. Co. (1901) 61 S. C. 83, 39 S. E.
257; Portland Nat. Gas & Oil Co. v. State (1893) 135 Ind. 54, 34 N. E. 818.
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breach of its duty to serve all applicants on the ground that an-
other utility is willing and able to perform the duties which are
sought from it. As was said in a New Hampshire case: 10 8
"the utility cannot question the motive which prompts a
consumer to desire service of it in preference to obtaining it
from some other source. The point is that the one desiring
service is willing to meet the reasonable terms of the utility,
and that, therefore, it is the duty of the utility to furnish it.
The reason set forth by the Laconia company for its un-
willingness to serve the district is untenable. However
praiseworthy may be the altruistic spirit which prompts its
reluctance to take away business from another utility with
which it is on friendly terms, this does not fulfil its legal obli-
gation to furnish service upon reasonable terms to anyone in
its territory desiring it."
And in a Pennsylvania case,' 0 9 where a druggist used his land-
lord's small lighting system and had the electric company's con-
nection only for emergency purposes, it was held that the company
could not cut off his supply in accordance with its rule that a
customer could not use any facilities except those furnished by
it unless the company consented thereto. The commission in-
timated that in such situations the company could establish a
flat rate since it had a right to adopt rates which would secure it
an adequate return for the facilities it afforded the public. The
company, were it allowed in such cases to enforce a rule requir-
ing a consumer to take all his service from the company or none
at all, could insure itself a monopoly and at the same time violate
its plain common law duty to serve the public impartially.
However, there are numerous cases holding that duplication
of service is not required of a service company."10 But most of
these decisions are based on the facts of each particular case, for
instance, as where the present service is satisfactory and to have
the other company duplicate it could put it to great expense,"'
or overload its present plant.1 2 A West Virginia decision 1 3 went
so far as to say that where the commission allows two rivals to
108 Village Dist. of Belmont v. Laconia Gas & Elec. Co. (N. H. 1924)
P. U. R. 1925 A, 349; see Ind. Nat. Gas Co. v. State (1904) 162 Ind. 690,
71 N. E. 133 accord.
109 Strathie v. Bucks Co. Elec. Co. (Pa. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 290; see
People v. P. S. Comm. (1914) 148 N. Y. S. 583, 163 App. Div. 705.
=0 For an early case see Fleming v. Montgomery Lt. Co. (1892) 100 Ala.
657,13 So. 618; Okla. Nat. Gas. Co. v. Kelly (Okla. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 C, 414.11 United Fuel & Gas Co. v. P. S. Comm. of W. Va. (W. Va. 1927) 138 S. E.
388; Marr v. Glendale (1919) 40 Cal. App. 748, P. U. R. 1919 E, 679.
1312Re Batesville Elec. Lt. & P. Co. (Ind. 1922) P. U. R. 1922 E, 10.
113 United Fuel &' Gas Co. v. P. S. Comm. of W. Va., note 111, supra.
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charge different rates, patrons of the company charging the
higher rate could not change simply to get the benefit of the lower
rate offered by the other company. This reasoning seems clearly
wrong, though the commission seems to be in greater fault than
the court for allowing such a situation to exist.
SERVICE TO A COMPETITOR
There is high authority for the general proposition of law that
one competitor in business cannot demand service of another in
the promotion of its business, even though the competitor seeks
only the finished product delivered at his door." 4 But if a utility
sells electric power for resale to its subsidiary corporation it has
been held that it cannot then refuse such service to competitors
of such subsidiary.115 A temptation always arises, when a public
service company engages in a collateral business, to use the power
in its public business to promote its collateral business. This
clearly cannot be done because the rule as to serving a rival does
not apply, since each of its businesses is to be looked at separately
and when this is done no rivalry is seen to be present. Thus a
telephone company which also conducted a carriage and coupe
service could not, to promote its latter business, refuse full tele-
phone service to a transfer company; the parties in such case not
being rivals as to the telephone business." 6 But where a former
consumer started supplying others in his neighborhood from a
private electric generating plant he had installed in his building,
it was held that the electric service company could deny him
"breakdown" service, which he wished to have in case of emer-
gency." 7 And a regulation of any utility forbidding service to
customers refusing to enter a contract not to resell power received
from the company has in several cases been held to be a reason-
able regulation since a utility is not required to supply anyone who
intends to compete with it." s This right to deny service to a
competitor of the utility is usually sustained on the ground that
a public utility need not aid in furthering the rival's business.
11' State ex rel. Fletcher v. N. W. Bell Tel. Co. (Ia. 1932) 240 N. W. 252,
P. U. R. 1932 C, 42; Home Tel. Co. v. Sarcoxie L. & Tel. Co. (1911) 236 Mo.
114, 139 S. W. 108; Central Stockyards Co. v. L. & N. R. Co. (1903) 192 U. S.
568; People v. Hudson R. Tel. Co. (1887) 19 Abb. 466; Rogers Iron Works
v. P. S. Comm. (1929) 323 Mo. 122, 18 S. W. (2d) 420; Fla. P. & L. Co.
v. State ex rel, Malcolm et al. (Fla. 1932) 144 So. 657; A.M. Lighting Co. v.
P. S. Corp. of N. J. (C. C. N. J. 1904) 132 F. 794.
I' N. C. P. S. Comm. v. So. Power Co. (1922) 282 F. 837.
16 Louisville Trans. Co. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. (1881) 1 Ky. L. J. 144.
'IT People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. P. U. Comm. (1920) 191 App. Div.
237, 181 N. Y. S. 259.
2"1 67th St. Mum. Inc. v. P. U. Comm. of N. J. (N. J. 1929) 147 Atl. 735;
Karrick v. Potomac Elec. P. Co. et al. (D. C. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 C, 40.
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INSUFFICIENT FACILITIES
Where all the rooms of an inn are full, the innkeeper is under
no obligation to receive further applicants. 119 This seems too
clear for doubt. And so the rule was at common law as to car-
riers, but modern conditions have changed the rule as to the latter
and the modern railroad is now bound to use due diligence to pro-
vide sufficient cars to carry on its business, and in the ordinary
case cannot'excuse itself for failure to carry passengers or goods
merely by showing it did not have sufficient cars at the particular
locality to transport them.120 As to the municipal utilities-gas,
water, electric, railway and telephone companies-they are
definitely required to give full service to all comers in the locality
to which their franchise is limited. Only exceptions to this gen-
eral rule need be pointed out. One of these centers around the
question of extensions and as to when they are required to be
made; the situation in the usual case being that of a member of
a sparsely settled district wanting the utility to extend its facili-
ties to his door. The law on this point is well expressed in a Mis-
souri case: 121
"The fact that defendant accepted a franchise and has under-
taken to furnish the entire community with electricity does
not of itself require the defendant to extend its service to any
resident of the community who may request the same. The
defendant has undertaken a duty of a public nature in supply-
ing electricity to meet the necessities of the public. The obli-
gation imposed by law upon defendant does not give each or
any number of persons in the community the right to demand
electric service from defendant under any and all circum-
stances. The defendant has only undertaken and incurred
the legal obligation to discharge its duty to furnish electricity
to the public when there is a reasonable demand for it; hence
the question to be determined upon consideration of a pro-
posed extension is whether there is a reasonable demand for
such extension."
A utility cannot extend its mains indefinitely to reach a single
new consumer or a small number of new consumers and at the
same time furnish service to all at the same average unit cost.
Equitable rules as to extensions are necessary or else frequent
readjustments-of rates of all consumers to fit the changed condi-
"19 Browne v. Brandt (1902) 1 K. B. 696; Russell v. Fagan (Del. 1886)
7 Houst. 389, 8 AtI. 258.
120 Tucker v. Pac. R. Co. (1872) 50 Mo. 385; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Harris
(1886) 67 Tex. 166.
121 Harnage v. St. L. County Gas Co. (Mo. 1924) P. U. R. 1925 B, 1.
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tions would be necessary. 122 Thus where an applicant has the
means of supplying himself from a private or public source near
at hand an extension may be denied.123 Unreasonable extensions
of plants into unprofitable territory which cannot support such
service will not be required because, it has been held, it would be
confiscatory in effect in certain instances. 12 4
The second exception to the general rule is this: a situation
may develop in certain kinds of public service where service may
be refused the applicant because of conditions beyond the control
of the utility. This is particularly true where the commodity
supplied is either water or natural gas. But if the drought in
the case of water, or the inadequacy of sufficient wells in the case
of natural gas, could have been provided against by the company,
a failure to take reasonable precautions to anticipate the situa-
tion will not be excused. One case, 125 where the water company
attempted to excuse its four failures to supply proper water in
the preceding four years, on the grounds of a drought each time,
which was shown to be usual, warranted forfeiture of its charter.
In an Indiana case126 where the town's supply of natural gas
came from the near-by wells of the service company the situation
had reached the stage where either the industries had to be cut
off entirely or else neither they nor the domestic users could be
given service that would halfway meet the needs of both. The
state commission decreed that the company discontinue service to
the industries upon thirty days' notice to them. The California
commission 127 in a somewhat similar case held that water must
be supplied for domestic use in preference to a swimming tank
where the supply was inadequate to serve both. Thus the rule
may be said to be that the domestic consumer is to be preferred
over business or industrial users in any case where the supply is
not sufficient to meet the demand in the circumstances, which
seems correct in principle. 128
Where the supply is inadequate to supply present customers
the courts invariably hold that that does not relieve the company
from furnishing a new applicant with service. In a New York
22 Northern Woods Products Co. v. Jacobs (1924) P. U. R. 1924 A, 193.
123 Hooper Realty Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co. (Md. 1915) P. U. R.
1915 A, 339; Booth-Schumaker Co. v. Wis.-Minn. Lt. & P. Co. (Wis. 1916)
P. U. R. 1917 A, 758; Marr v. City of Glendale (1919) 40 Cal. App. 748, 181
Pac. 671, P. U. R. 1919 E, 679.
124 P. S. Comm. v. Brooklyn & Curtis Bay L. & W. Co. (1914) 122 Md. 612,
90 Atl. 89.
125 Capital City Water Co. v. State (1894) 105 Ala. 406, 432, 18 So. 62.
126 Re Knightstown Nat. Gas Co. (Ind. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 F, 667.
127 Re Peters-Rhoades Co. (Cal. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 B, 787.
128 Boonton v. Boonton Water Co. (1904) 69 N. J. Eq. 23, 61 Atl. 390.
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case' 29 the supply of natural gas for the town had run so low that
none had been used for several years for industrial or house-heat-
ing purposes. The company officials frankly admitted that every
means was taken to "bluff out" all new applicants since even the
present consumers could not be adequately served. But the com-
mission, saying it had no discretion in the matter, held that in
no case could the supply be restricted to consumers already being
served, even though full service could not be given to all. As was
said by the Indiana Supreme Court:
"In the rendering of such a service there should be no ad-
vantage accorded to prior applicants. It cannot be doubted
that there is equality of right on the part of each of the in-
habitants living along applicant's mains."'130
To the contrary is the rule in the case of the exhaustion of the
irrigation supply. Prior takings appropriating the available
supply is held to constitute a justification for the refusal of fur-
ther applications. 131 Though a noted authority 13 2 criticises the
rule in the case of natural gas companies on the ground that the
result gives satisfactory service to none, not even to the applicant
in question, and is hardly consistent with public service for all,
that contention may be met by the argument that the company's
duty is to serve all alike who are similarly situated, and it would
be better that unsatisfactory service be given to all, than that
some should get a full supply while others, merely because they
are newcomers, should be totally denied any service at all. Log-
ically and ethically it would seem that the public welfare would
be better served by inconveniencing, somewhat, the present
takers, rather than allowing the latter to enjoy complete service at
the expense of later applicants. Of course, where the situation
is so grave that to further divide the available supply would be to
practically deny all any service of any value, then, but only then,
should service be denied to the new consumer. But otherwise, a
proportionate share of the supply should be given to new ap-
plicants.
SUMMARY
To attempt to say what situations are strictly up to the un-
regulated managerial discretion of the utility itself is apparently
129 Stevenson v. Baldwinsville Lt. & Heat Co. (N. Y. 1920) P. U. R.
1920 F, 903.130 Indiana Nat. Gas & 0. Co. v. State ex rel. (1904) 162 Ind. 690, 71 N. E.
133; see State ex rel. Wood v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co. (1901) 157 Ind. 345,
61 N. E. 674, accord.
131 Bardsly v. Boise Irr. & Land Co. (1901) 8 Idaho 155 67 Pac. 428;
San Diego Flume Co. v. Southern (1901) 122 F. 228.
1321 Wyman, Public Service qorporations (1921) 530.
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a most difficult task. It seems that the company may refuse
absolutely whenever the service is either wanted for an illegal
purpose or else demanded without prepayment. The authorities
agree that in both situations the utility may refuse service at its
own discretion. But can these two situations be said to be truly
matters in which the power of unregulated discretion exists in
and of the company? In the case of illegal purposes the law it-
self says that the company should refuse service since otherwise
it would be aiding and abetting crime. In the case of prepay-
ment the only discretion which lies with the company is whether
or not prepayment shall be required or else credit given.
In both of the instances mentioned above the company does not
need to file any rule with the commission or serve notice to the
public as such in order to refuse service. But where the utility
wishes to lay down any other rule it must at least give sufficient
notice'33 to the public in general so that customers may have a
fair opportunity of knowing what it is and what they must do.
Without regulations a company may refuse to accede to particular
requests, but then it must show that the particular request is un-
reasonable.134
When a rule is filed with the commission, the settled rule of law
is that it is binding not only on the utility, but also the commission
and the public as well. 135 But once filed, a rule cannot be changed
without the consent of the commission. 13 6 The Missouri Com-
mission has been held to lack power in specific instances, to com-
pel a company to make extensions and furnish service in violation
of the rules which are on file with it and have its approval, express
or implied, and which are applicable to the public as a whole. 137
But the commission will not hesitate to modify a utility's rules and
regulations in any particular case whenever it is satisfied that
such modification is necessary to do justice either to the patrons
or to the utility. 38
The regulation of rates have no real meaning without the qual-
ity of the service being considered also. And since this is so and
since, also, nearly every rule is undeniably tied up with either
the rates, the health, the comfort, the convenience, or the safety
133 As to what constitutes sufficient notice: see Renand v. N. Y., N. H., and
H. R. Co. (1912) 210 Mass. 553, 97 N. E. 98.
184 State ex rel. Kennedy v. P. S. Comm. (Mo. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 349.
135 Bennett v. St. Louis County Water Co. (Mo. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 293.I" State ex rel. P. U. Comm. v. Mo. K. & T. R. Co. (1925) 117 Kan. 651,
P. U. R. 1925 C, 761, 232 Pac. 1038.
137 State ex rel. St. Louis County Gas Co. v. P. U. Comm. (1926) 315 Mo.
312, P. U. R. 1927 A, 187, 286 S. W. 84.
'8 Lortz v. Union Elec. Light & Power (Mo. 1918) P. U. R. 1918 F, 223.
And see Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. P. S. Comm. (1917) 81 W. Va. 457,
94 S. E. 545.
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of the public, the only conclusion is that in no case (but perhaps
that of prepayment) is the utility actually possessed of "unregu-
lated managerial discretion" in the making of its rules. Even
the smoking and "move forward in the car" regulations of a
street car company are subject to the full control of the commis-
sion. 139 As a result the inevitable conclusion is that there is no
true field of unregulated "self-regulation"-as was said by the
Missouri Supreme Court in a somewhat recent case, in speaking
of the powers of the state commission, it possesses "plenary super-
vision of every business feature."140
SIDNEY J. MURPHY, '34.
THE MODERN INNKEEPER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES
TO THE PERSON OF HIS GUEST
In the busy and complex social and business life of today the
innkeeper plays an important part. It is his function to furnish
a place of temporary abode to our vast transient population, and
entertainment to travellers and others. His place of business
may be in the small structure which the village calls "hotel" or in
one of the enormously costly plants which go under the same
generic name in our large cities and which cater to the guest's
every whim. His business has developed from the isolated inns
of feudal times into an enterprise which in 1928 ranked ninth
among the great industries of the United States. In that year
there were in the United States nearly twenty-six thousand
hotels, representing an investment of over five billion dollars,
employing over a half-million people, and supplying service and
accommodations to millions of people yearly.'
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the modern law as it
relates to the innkeeper's liability for the personal injuries or
death of his guest, while the guest is infra hospitum, that is,
within the precincts of the inn and under the innkeeper's care.2
Or, viewed conversely, it is the purpose of this paper to discover
what degree of protection is afforded to the guest by the law as it
has been developed by decisions or changed by statute. Because
of the very nature of the topic, the paper will largely resolve it-
self into a survey of the pertinent law as it is in the United States
today. But when the occasion offers the opportunity, a critical
139 See West End Business Men's Ass'n v. United Ry. Co. of St. Louis(1915) P. U. R. 1915 D, 482; Coombs v. So. Wis. Ry. Co. (1916) 162 Wis.
111, 155 N. W. 922.
140 State v. Kansas City Gas Co. (1913) 254 Mo. 515, 163 S. W. 854.
1 The Official Hotel Red Book (1928).
2 Davidson v. Madison Corporation (1932) 247 N. Y. S. 789.
Washington University Open Scholarship
